Believing a category is natural grants inference power and permanence
Evidence
If people believe that a category is a natural kind, then two important principles follow. First, a natural category affords inductive potential; that is, one can infer a lot about members of the category because such things are true of all members. When people see a robin sitting on a branch, they can assume certain things about it (e.g., it can fly, eats worms, chirps, etc.). Such inductive potential is greater for natural kinds than for artifactual categories. Second, membership in a natural kind is unalterable. A robin is a robin, and no amount of blue spray-paint will transform it into a bluebird. In contrast, the fundamental “nature” of an artifactual category object can be changed, for the simple reason that it has no underlying essence (apart from its function). — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 1387 (
#expands, via linked claim)
Categorization
- XREF: connects to: Successful métissage dissolves the very category once realized; Natural-kind categories license inferences but forbid membership change; Believing a category is a natural kind licenses strong inferences and immutability. — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 1387 (+2 more)
Broader Connections
- Believing a category is a natural kind licenses strong inferences and immutability.
#expands(0.97) — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 1387