Moral patiency rests on a target’s perceived capacity for pain and pleasure.

Evidence

Philosophies of ethics usually define moral patiency, in turn, as the capacity to be acted upon in ways that can be evaluated as good or evil. The moral evaluation of the action of shooting a rifle, for example, varies dramatically depending on whether the gun is aimed at an old tin can, a duck, a kitten, or a schoolyard. Moral evaluations arise when the target of the action has rights or interests and can be harmed or helped by an action (McPherson, 1984). Such harm or help hinges on the perceived ability of the target to experience events as pleasurable or painful. In other words, moral patients are entities that are sensitive to pain or pleasure, or at least those that appreciate the significance of events for potential pleasure or pain (Bernstein, 1998). — Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, Moral Typecasting, 14

Categorization

• DEFINE: Core definition distinguishing moral patiency (being acted upon) from agency, key to the reader’s recategorization paradigm research.
• XREF: Grounds the reader’s planned experiment: shifting how a religious group is labeled should alter perceived patiency/vulnerability and thus threat evaluation. — connects to: People rationally allocate pain and pleasure by target moral sensitivity. — Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, Moral Typecasting: Divergent…, 137; A moral versus nonmoral context shifts who is seen as vulnerable to pain. — Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, Moral Typecasting: Divergent…, 100; Moral agency and patiency can be cleanly measured through resistance-to-pain and responsibility scenarios — Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, Moral Typecasting: Divergent…, 126 (+7 more)
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, Moral Typecasting: Divergent…, 14

Broader Connections

• Judgments of pain sensitivity reveal a target’s perceived moral patient status #corroborates (0.94)
• Moral patiency is operationalizable through perceived vulnerability to harm. #expands (0.88) — Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, Moral Typecasting, 62
• Casting someone as a moral agent reduces perceived sensitivity to pain #corroborates (0.85) — Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, Moral Typecasting, 88
• People rationally allocate pain and pleasure by target moral sensitivity. #expands (0.82) — Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, Moral Typecasting, 137
• Moral disengagement reduces victims’ perceived suffering and thus the desire for justice #corroborates (0.80)
• A moral versus nonmoral context shifts who is seen as vulnerable to pain. #qualifies (0.78) — Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, Moral Typecasting, 100
• Moral patiency is fundamentally the capacity to receive moral action #qualifies (0.76) — Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, Moral Typecasting, 105
• Moral self-censure strength depends on how perpetrators regard their victims. #corroborates (0.75) — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 584
• Moral agency and patiency can be cleanly measured through resistance-to-pain and responsibility scenarios #complicates (0.74) — Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, Moral Typecasting, 126
• Perceived moral agency and perceived patiency may trade off inversely even at extreme levels. #complicates (0.72) — Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, Moral Typecasting, 59