Modernity’s trust requires the awareness that human activity is socially created, not divinely given.

Evidence

In conditions of modernity, trust exists in the context of (a) the general awareness that human activity—including within this phrase the impact of technology upon the material world—is socially created, rather than given in the nature of things or by divine influence; (b) the vastly increased transformative scope of human action, brought about by the dynamic character of modern social institutions. The concept of risk replaces that of fortuna, but this is not because agents in pre-modern times could not distinguish between risk and danger. Rather it represents an alteration in the perception of determination and contingency, such that human moral imperatives, natural causes, and chance reign in place of religious cosmologies. — Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 89

Categorization

• XREF: Stevens transfers quasi-religious devotion from God to the institution of great-house service — the perception of “determination and contingency” shifting to human moral imperatives explains why his trust is absolute and his ethical collapse complete. — connects to: Modern trust is vested in abstract capacities, not individuals — Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 72; Modern dangers are produced by socially organized knowledge, not nature — Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 262; Humanity functions as an organizing idea, not a concrete entity — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 215 (+4 more)

Related

• Modern society needs non-personal trust beyond what individuals provide (similarity 0.86)
• Modern trust is vested in abstract capacities, not individuals (similarity 0.85)
• System trust survives individual disappointments that would destroy personal trust (similarity 0.82)
• Traditional societies reduce complexity through religious norms rather than impersonal trust (similarity 0.82)
• System trust cannot supply the mutuality that personal trust provides (similarity 0.82)
• Trust is defined by the reason for expectation, not the expectation itself (similarity 0.81)
• Trust in persons and things sustains ontological security. (similarity 0.81)
• Giddens describes how trust in abstract systems develops as ‘faceless commitments,’ yet notes relations of trust are always ambivalent because confidence is needed amid fundamental ignorance of… (similarity 0.81)
• Trust as a distinct social phenomenon emerged only under modern conditions of risk (similarity 0.81)
• Pre-modern trust is anchored in local place rather than abstract systems. (similarity 0.81)
• Familiarity prevents trust from becoming a conscious problem; doubt reopens it. (similarity 0.81)
• System trust underwrites ontological security but yields no psychological reward (similarity 0.81)
• Differentiated societies need more trust to reduce their greater complexity (similarity 0.80)
• Trust requires belief in the other’s motivations, not mere behavioral expectation (similarity 0.80)
• Most people are more inclined to trust people they know than to trust remote expertise or an abstract system, so contemporary life demands trust in science they cannot personally verify. (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Social and cultural structures overdetermine our natural human constitution. #corroborates (0.70)
• Modern dangers are produced by socially organized knowledge, not nature #corroborates (0.65) — Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 262
• Humanity functions as an organizing idea, not a concrete entity #corroborates (0.60) — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 215
• Social complexity forces the shift from personal to impersonal, system-governed trust. #corroborates (0.55)
• Society is constituted by communication, not by similarity of customs. #corroborates (0.55)
• Differentiated societies need more trust to reduce their greater complexity #expands (0.50)