Modern western wrongdoing maps onto utilitarian harm to others

Evidence

If people do not perceive that ingroup members caused an event, they are not likely to feel guilt. However, merely acknowledging that a member of one’s ingroup has caused a negative event does not guarantee a collective guilt reaction, because feelings of collective guilt should be unlikely if the actions of one’s ingroup are viewed as justified by the demands of the situation. For example, the internment of Japanese-Americans in the United States during World War II was very likely viewed by many if not most Americans as being justified by a need for national security, a need outweighing the desire to protect the civil rights of an immigrant population. — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt, 297 (#complicates, via linked claim)

We recognize that in certain times (such as wartime) or in certain places (such as prison death rows) actions that bring harm or even death to other individuals, are regarded by many not only as not evil, but as morally required actions, so we add a reference to “unjustified harmdoing” as the morally wrong sort of harmdoing. — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 3863 (#complicates, via linked claim)

This definition needs qualification, but the moves to qualify it are well understood. Briefly, we need to rule out certain harmful actions, such as unforeseeable accidents, as necessarily morally wrong. So we add to the definition a qualification: a notion of a wrongdoing actor as somehow intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly harming or causing pain to another individual. — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 3862 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Utilitarian justifications for violence rest on biased estimates of future harm — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement: How People Do Harm…, 394; Whether harm counts as morally wrong depends on context and justification — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 3863; People justify harm through utilitarian necessity and euphemistic concealment — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement: How People Do Harm…, 2974 (+9 more)

Broader Connections

• Perceiving a group’s wrongdoing as situationally justifiable blocks collective guilt #complicates (0.85) — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt, 297
• Whether harm counts as morally wrong depends on context and justification #complicates (0.82) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 3863
• Wrongdoing requires intentional, knowing, or reckless harm #complicates (0.80) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 3862