Justified cruelty harms victims more than unapologetic cruelty does

Evidence

Maltreatment that is blamed on the victim can have more devastating human consequences than the cruelty that the perpetrator acknowledges. Mistreatment that is not clothed in righteousness makes the perpetrator rather than the victim blameworthy. But when victims are convincingly blamed for their plight, they may eventually come to believe the degrading characterizations of themselves. Exonerated inhumanity is more likely to instill self-dislike in victims than inhumanity that does not attempt to justify itself. Seeing victims suffer maltreatment for which they are held responsible also leads observers to derogate them (Lerner & Miller, 1978). The devaluation and indignation aroused by ascribed culpability provide further moral justification for even greater maltreatment. — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 627 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Drawing on the utilitarian principle, some individuals also argue that it is necessary do some harm to achieve the greater common good. Justifications by forceful metaphor also are common. Gerald Grow, who wrote a satirical guide to writing misinformatively, would be astounded by the euphemistic creativity designed to conceal detrimental practices. — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 2974 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Victim-blaming harms victims more deeply than acknowledged cruelty does — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement: How People Do Harm…, 627; Labeling harmful acts euphemistically increases how cruelly people behave; People justify harm through utilitarian necessity and euphemistic concealment — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement: How People Do Harm…, 2974 (+1 more)

Broader Connections

• Victim-blaming harms victims more deeply than acknowledged cruelty does #corroborates (0.95) — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 627
• People justify harm through utilitarian necessity and euphemistic concealment #complicates (0.72) — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 2974