Modern theories expose legislatures as not purely public-interested bodies.

Evidence

We no longer think of statutes as typically, let alone invariably, the product of well-meaning efforts to maximize the public interest by legislators who are devoted to the public interest and who are the faithful representatives of constituents who share the same devotion. … The theory of social choice has instructed us about the difficulties of aggregating preferences by the method of voting, while the interest-group theory of politics in the version revived by economists has taught us that the legislative process often caters to the redistributive desires of narrow coalitions and, in so doing, disserves the public interest, plausibly construed. — Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 107

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to public-choice economics and Arrow’s impossibility theorem familiar from political economy literature. — connects to: Legislative hearings function as displays of raw power, not deliberation. — Robert A. Caro, The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the…, 4571; One-person-one-vote equality rests on a contested image of legislatures as mirrors of popular will. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 3755; Lawyer-legislators acted as agents for organized interests, not mere occupational representatives. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 4119