Lawyer-legislators acted as agents for organized interests, not mere occupational representatives.

Evidence

The high number of lawyers swelled the middle-class predominance. But the implications of this evidence require careful weighing, for the history of the bar shows the persistent tendency of all politically effective, organised interests to take the lawyer as their agent. No great difference appeared in this respect between rural and urban areas. … Occupational background thus suggested some material facts about the general class attitudes likely to be prominent in legislative operations. The evidence cannot safely be pressed further; on occasion a legislature might give quite direct expression to particular occupational interests of particular legislators, but in the large, there was little evidence for the specific influence of occupation on legislative performance. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 4119

Categorization

  • XREF: Important for the Law course thread on lawyers as institutional intermediaries; ties lawyers’ visible numerical dominance in legislatures to their function as agents of organized interests rather than self-interested occupational voting. — connects to: Standing committees, not the full chambers, actually make congressional policy — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 4024; Buying a legislator’s vote is legitimate for voters but not for paid lawyers — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 300; Modern theories expose legislatures as not purely public-interested bodies. — Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 107 (+2 more)

Broader Connections