Misinformation researchers should avoid equating disagreement with falsehood
Evidence
Given the stakes involved, misinformation researchers cannot afford to employ an, “I know it when I see it,” epistemology that conflates ideas that researchers personally disagree with for some reason with ideas that are objectively false . It may be the case that such an epistemology gets it right sometimes, but it might be impossible to know how often. As such, we may find that circumspection, on our own part, is best. — Joseph Uscinski, Shane Littrell, and Casey Klofstad, The Importance of Epistemology for the…, 166
Categorization
- QUESTION: Worth asking: is there any empirical way to calibrate when a researcher’s own moral/political intuitions track objective falsehood in misinformation claims?
- XREF: connects to: Disagreement over evidence can stem from accuracy motives or identity motives — Sander van der Linden, Foolproof: Why Misinformation Infects…, 140; The misinformation debate splits between tribal-motivated and accuracy-driven accounts of reasoning — Sander van der Linden, Foolproof: Why Misinformation Infects…, 136; Effective debunking frames corrections around the truth, not the repeated myth — Sander van der Linden, Foolproof: Why Misinformation Infects…, 286
Related
- The misinformation debate splits between tribal-motivated and accuracy-driven accounts of reasoning (similarity 0.83)
- Truth-seeking assumptions leave people unprepared for deliberate lying (similarity 0.83)
- Joseph Uscinski, Shane Littrell, and Casey Klofstad — The Importance of Epistemology for the Study of Misinformation (similarity 0.81)
- Disagreement over evidence can stem from accuracy motives or identity motives (similarity 0.81)
- Belief in misinformation ranges from automatic to deliberative along a continuum. (similarity 0.81)
- False beliefs often stem from bad sources rather than closed minds (similarity 0.81)
- Everyone is cognitively susceptible to misinformation, not just outliers (similarity 0.79)
- Theoretical doubts about objective truth need not override practical reliance on evidence (similarity 0.78)
Broader Connections
- Disagreement over evidence can stem from accuracy motives or identity motives
#expands(0.85) — Sander van der Linden, Foolproof, 140 - The misinformation debate splits between tribal-motivated and accuracy-driven accounts of reasoning
#expands(0.80) — Sander van der Linden, Foolproof, 136 - Effective debunking frames corrections around the truth, not the repeated myth
#corroborates(0.75) — Sander van der Linden, Foolproof, 286