Misinformation researchers should avoid equating disagreement with falsehood

Evidence

Given the stakes involved, misinformation researchers cannot afford to employ an, “I know it when I see it,” epistemology that conflates ideas that researchers personally disagree with for some reason with ideas that are objectively false . It may be the case that such an epistemology gets it right sometimes, but it might be impossible to know how often. As such, we may find that circumspection, on our own part, is best. — Joseph Uscinski, Shane Littrell, and Casey Klofstad, The Importance of Epistemology for the…, 166

Categorization

  • QUESTION: Worth asking: is there any empirical way to calibrate when a researcher’s own moral/political intuitions track objective falsehood in misinformation claims?
  • XREF: connects to: Disagreement over evidence can stem from accuracy motives or identity motives — Sander van der Linden, Foolproof: Why Misinformation Infects…, 140; The misinformation debate splits between tribal-motivated and accuracy-driven accounts of reasoning — Sander van der Linden, Foolproof: Why Misinformation Infects…, 136; Effective debunking frames corrections around the truth, not the repeated myth — Sander van der Linden, Foolproof: Why Misinformation Infects…, 286

Broader Connections