Disagreement over evidence can stem from accuracy motives or identity motives

Evidence

To understand how our study arbitrates between these competing explanations of how people reason about evidence, we have to return to Jamie Druckman’s ‘observational equivalence’ paradox. In other words, we need to disentangle two competing explanations: either people are motivated by accuracy but they’ve been duped by misinformation (or selectively exposed to just one line of evidence) and would change their beliefs if given the opportunity to do so, or people are not motivated by accuracy and as a result will reject and discount evidence that is not congruent with their personal or political beliefs. — Sander van der Linden, Foolproof, 140

Categorization

• DEFINE: Explains Druckman’s observational equivalence paradox: two mutually exclusive mechanisms yield the identical observed disagreement.
• XREF: connects to: Platform incentive structure suppresses accuracy motives and amplifies identity motives — Sander van der Linden, Foolproof: Why Misinformation Infects…, 467; People often resist or reverse belief updating rather than tracking evidence — Sander van der Linden, Foolproof: Why Misinformation Infects…, 104; The misinformation debate splits between tribal-motivated and accuracy-driven accounts of reasoning — Sander van der Linden, Foolproof: Why Misinformation Infects…, 136 (+15 more)

Broader Connections

• Initial stereotypes bias perception of identical evidence to confirm themselves #exemplifies (0.85) — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 1175
• Directionally motivated reasoning makes people reject disconfirming evidence and seek explanations for it. #expands (0.85) — Sander van der Linden, Foolproof, 166
• Confrontation with contrary evidence can intensify rather than weaken firm belief. #exemplifies (0.84) — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 97
• Stereotypes act as hypotheses that bias evidence gathering toward confirmation #exemplifies (0.83) — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 1174
• Even disconfirmation evidence often fails to break a person’s confirmation bias #expands (0.82) — Lee McIntyre, Post-Truth, 94
• Selective evidence use lets people maintain the illusion of being objective while holding prejudice #exemplifies (0.82) — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 2095
• Cognitive dissonance strengthens rather than weakens false beliefs under contrary evidence #exemplifies (0.82) — Mark Fisher (edited by Darren Ambrose), K-Punk, 1798
• Motivated reasoning is the motive while confirmation bias is the mechanism #expands (0.80) — Lee McIntyre, Post-Truth, 100
• Contradictory evidence is neutralized by subtyping rather than revising stereotypes #expands (0.80)
• Confirmation bias and inertia make reputations resistant to disconfirming evidence #expands (0.79)
• Repeated stereotypes create interpretive frames that filter out disconfirming evidence #exemplifies (0.79) — Carl W. Ernst, Islamophobia in America_ The Anatomy of…, 94
• Being more negatively biased about a group can coexist with higher accuracy toward it #qualifies (0.78) — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 882
• False equivalence can disguise bias under a show of balance #complicates (0.75) — Lee McIntyre, Post-Truth, 350