Mind reading by simulation requires suppressing one’s own mental states

Evidence

Consider the false beliefs task described above. A perceiver might ask herself, “If I was Suzy and I did not know that my mom moved the iPod, where would I look for it?” Mitchell (2009) suggests that such simulation is just one part of mind reading and that mind reading may also require that perceivers suppress their own current mental states (e.g., I know the iPod is on the charger, but Suzy does not) and decide if the target person is similar enough to warrant a simulation (e.g., I think I understand how kids like Suzy think). — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 377

Categorization

• DEFINE: Clarifies that simulation-based mind reading is multi-part: perspective-taking, self-suppression, and similarity judgment.
• XREF: connects to: Speculative reading demands the self lose form then recover it — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 1224; Human slowness in these games reflects effortful inhibition of automatic imitation — Joseph Henrich, The Secret of Our Success: How Culture…, 100