People read other minds by applying learned implicit theories about behavior

Evidence

Modern theory of mind has a complex history beginning in the philosophy of science and mind. It starts with the quandary of “other minds.” How can two people, whose thoughts are enclosed within separate skulls, ever know each other’s thoughts? The literature on theory of mind offers two apparently competing solutions, which are of general interest in social psychology, a discipline uniquely qualified to serve as a hub of research in the area (Epley & Waytz, 2010; Goldman, 2006). One solution to the quandary is called the theory-theory (Gopnik & Wellman, 1994), according to which children and adults operate like scientists who acquire a set of implicit principles or theories about the workings of the physical and social world. In the process of learning about other minds, children acquire a knowledge base or folk psycho logy about the beliefs, desires, and intentions of others. In this acquired theory, people act on the basis of their desires, beliefs, and intentions (e.g., Jane buys a Starbucks latte every afternoon because she thinks it makes her more alert). In addition, the theory views people as capable of metacognition about the mental states of self and others (e.g., Jane doesn’t know that I know she is such a loyal Starbucks customer). — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 373 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Not surprisingly, such projection can be biased in a number of ways (Birch & Bloom, 2004; Epley & Waytz, 2010). For example, consider a study in which perceivers were first asked to engage in vigorous exercise before completing a social judgment task (Van Boven & Loewenstein, 2003). In the judgment task, the perceivers were told about a group of hikers who lost their way and were short on drinking water. Due to their previous physical exertion, these perceivers were particularly likely to assume that the hikers would be thirsty (as opposed to hungry). In other words, our own experiences can bias our efforts to understand another person’s world. — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 378 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Unstructured behavioral signals can reconstruct detailed narratives about each user — Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, 209; Born members embody status knowledge unconsciously while upstarts must learn it deliberately — W. David Marx, Status and Culture: How Our Desire for…, 158; Children activate causal reasoning mainly when observing people use cultural artifacts — Joseph Henrich, The Secret of Our Success: How Culture…, 378 (+10 more)

Broader Connections

• The theory-theory holds that people infer others’ minds by applying learned implicit laws. #corroborates (0.96) — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 373
• People sometimes read other minds by simulating the other’s perspective #complicates (0.82)
• Our own bodily states bias how we read other people’s minds #complicates (0.72) — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 378