Mere exposure effects depend on fluency misattributed to liking, not memory.

Evidence

Bornstein and D’Agostino (1992), pursuing a lead that came from Bernstein’s (1989) meta-analytic review, established that mere exposure effects are strongest when conditions reduce subjects’ memory for the effect-producing exposures. Under these circumstances, it appears that increased perceptual fluency of a repeatedly presented stimulus (that is, increased ease of its identification on re-exposure) is misattributed to liking, yielding a positive evaluation of the stimulus. — Anthony G. Greenwald and Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition, 103

Categorization

  • XREF: This fluency-misattribution account of mere exposure directly parallels the MOC’s group-defense mechanisms as implicit rather than explicit processes; connects to the reader’s broader implicit-cognition program and to familiarity/truth illusions literature. — connects to: Accessible memories can shape judgments without the person recognizing their causal influence. — Anthony G. Greenwald and Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes,…, 85; Mere exposure effects strengthen as memory for exposures is reduced.; Mere exposure to subliminal affects can transfer value to neutral stimuli via misattribution — Anthony G. Greenwald and Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes,…, 105 (+3 more)
  • DEFINE: Defines perceptual fluency as increased ease of identification on re-exposure being misattributed to liking.

Broader Connections