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Mafia families punish members who poach fellow members' clients.

Mafia families punish members who poach fellow members' clients.

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Sep 20, 20261 min read

Mafia families punish members who poach fellow members’ clients.

Related

  • Mafia violence exceeds what rational enforcement economics would require (similarity 0.87)
  • The mafia first appears in official records as an established force (similarity 0.85)
  • Mafia organizational structure is not governed by any ineluctable dynamic (similarity 0.85)
  • Entry into the mafia requires inherited skills or psychopathy plus no better options (similarity 0.84)
  • Mafia territory is jurisdiction-like but does not coincide with official boundaries (similarity 0.84)
  • Mafia affiliation is tied to residence, not portable status or letters. (similarity 0.83)
  • Client concentration and violent competition make mafia protection contracts fragile. (similarity 0.83)
  • Information within the mafia is compartmentalized along family and rank lines (similarity 0.82)
  • Illegality prevents mafia reputation from detaching from particular owners, blocking firm expansion (similarity 0.82)
  • Mafiosi can organize as well or as badly as ordinary economic actors (similarity 0.81)
  • A unified hierarchical mafia reduces internal conflict and public violence. (similarity 0.81)
  • Mafia secrecy is functional information control, not just cultural code (similarity 0.81)
  • Contractors join the mafia mainly out of a belief it is inevitable (similarity 0.81)
  • State weakness cannot explain the mafia’s emergence (similarity 0.80)
  • Mafia protection customers range from spot buyers to kin (similarity 0.80)

✉️
  • Mafia families punish members who poach fellow members’ clients.
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  • A unified hierarchical mafia reduces internal conflict and public violence.
  • Bypassing a protected intermediary to deal directly triggered a mafia murder.
  • Client concentration and violent competition make mafia protection contracts fragile.
  • Contractors join the mafia mainly out of a belief it is inevitable
  • Entry into the mafia requires inherited skills or psychopathy plus no better options
  • Group members punish free riders by withholding pairwise help from them.
  • Historical mafia market statistics are often double-counted in police reports.
  • Illegality prevents mafia reputation from detaching from particular owners, blocking firm expansion
  • Impartial third parties punish norm violators at personal cost.
  • Information within the mafia is compartmentalized along family and rank lines
  • Mafia affiliation is tied to residence, not portable status or letters.
  • Mafia membership rules forbid harming members and outsiders while mandating secrecy
  • Mafia organizational structure is not governed by any ineluctable dynamic
  • Mafia secrecy is functional information control, not just cultural code
  • Mafia territory is jurisdiction-like but does not coincide with official boundaries
  • Mafia violence exceeds what rational enforcement economics would require
  • Mafiosi can organize as well or as badly as ordinary economic actors
  • Mafiosi chose sides according to profit, not ideology or class loyalty
  • Status groups punish fraudulent pretenders more harshly than ordinary members.
  • The literature's conflicting definitions of mafiosi as middlemen, guards, and thugs defy synthesis.
  • The mafia first appears in official records as an established force