Lowering the bar for citizens to block reforms trades efficient reform for heavier taxation

Evidence

If the threshold for blocking M is set low, then the voters insure themselves that they will have a “voice” ex post. However, this makes reforms easily blocked. On the other hands, if M is high, reforms pass more easily, but a larger fraction of the population may be expropriated, thus, ex ante, the probability that each person is taxed is higher. — Philippe Aghion, Alberto Alesina, and Francesco Trebbi, Endogenous Political Institutions, 41

Categorization

• XREF: Echoes constitutional-design arguments about veto points and supermajority rules (e.g. Buchanan/Tullock on decision costs vs. external costs).
• SEED: An essay on how ‘voice’ mechanisms are always double-edged: the same institution that protects you ex post makes decisive action ex ante impossible.