Low and Gleeson’s own distributive principles secretly rest on recognition of nature

Evidence

But like Dobson, Low and Gleeson also miss the opportunity to use their own concerns to move beyond a narrow conception of distributive justice. This is especially frustrating given the fact that their two key principles of environmental justice only indirectly affect distribution. Those principles are, first, ‘[e]very natural entity is entitled to enjoy the fullness of its own form of life,’ and second, that ‘all life forms are mutually dependent and dependent on non-life forms’ (Low and Gleeson 1998: 156). Rather than address distribution, these principles are really about recognizing and respecting (a) the potential of nature and (b) the dependence of humans on the realization of this potential in nature. While Low and Gleeson proudly declare their adherence to a tradition of distributive justice, their own discussions and these central principles demonstrate the centrality of underlying social and cultural practices and beliefs that lead to the distribution of environmental ills—and the centrality of recognition in addressing those ills. — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice, 409

Categorization

• XREF: A key analytic payoff for the reader: shows that even avowedly distributive frameworks of justice to nature covertly presuppose recognition — supporting the book’s earlier recurring claim that recognition precedes distribution. — connects to: Dobson reduces all environmental injustice to maldistribution of goods and bads — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice:…, 403; Recognition of nature via shared qualities need not claim equality — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice:…, 436; Extending community to nature under-theorizes the recognition required — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice:…, 432 (+2 more)
• SEED: Essay angle: identify purportedly ‘distributive’ environmental-justice proposals that secretly depend on recognition — a test readers can apply across Legal Systems and Soundscape cases.

Broader Connections

• Recognition of nature via shared qualities need not claim equality #expands (0.78) — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice, 436
• Fraser’s status model lets recognition apply to nature without psychological claims #corroborates (0.75) — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice, 461
• Justice to nature can rest on shared qualities without erasing difference #expands (0.75) — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice, 449
• Extending community to nature under-theorizes the recognition required #complicates (0.72) — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice, 432