Recognition of nature via shared qualities need not claim equality

Evidence

Here the focus is on various qualities of the essence of being that we share with nonhuman nature: needs, sentience, interests, agency, physical integrity, and the unfolding of potential. We can certainly argue for this type of recognition of nature, based on similarities, without asserting that there is no difference between humans and nature. While many of these theories attempt to weaken the distinction between human beings and the rest of nature by recognizing qualities of nature that are important in themselves and worthy of the attention of justice, there is rarely a claim for ‘equality’. Rather, the argument is that these similarities should lead us to recognize our shared qualities and, so, include that similar, yet nonhuman, nature in the sphere of justice. — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice, 436

Categorization

• DEFINE: Names the specific shared-quality set (needs, sentience, interests, agency, integrity, potential) that grounds similarity-based recognition of nature.
• XREF: connects to: Grammar of animacy could ground legal standing for other species — Robin Wall Kimmerer, Braiding Sweetgrass: Indigenous Wisdom,…, 204; Low and Gleeson’s own distributive principles secretly rest on recognition of nature — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice:…, 409; Justice to nature can rest on shared qualities without erasing difference — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice:…, 449 (+2 more)

Broader Connections

• Extending moral consideration to nature need not imply equality with humans #corroborates (0.95) — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice, 391