Justice to nature can rest on shared qualities without erasing difference

Evidence

Here we can extend the community of justice by basing that community in some type of quality that we share with nature. This takes a recognition that we are like nature—not as separate or unique as we would like to think—and is something that Plumwood herself desires. This goes back to the argument made by Rodman (1977) that we develop a vocabulary that encompasses humans and nonhuman animals, but that is not based on purely human notions. The challenge posed by both Rodman and Plumwood is for us to recognize the distinctiveness of nature, but also the commonalities that we share. The focus, then, is on qualities that human beings have in common with many animals and/or the rest of the larger natural world; they are powerful indicators of what we share more broadly as the essence of being. In other words, there is plenty to recognize as shared by both humanity and the nature in which it operates. In this sense, the theoretical walls built by liberals between these two realms seem limited, artificial, and unnecessary. — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice, 449

Categorization

• DEFINE: Clarifies the ‘similarity’ route to ecological justice: it grounds moral community in shared qualities like sentience, agency, integrity rather than demanding equality or sameness.
• XREF: Connects to Fraser’s recognition theory where misrecognition is status subordination, and to the eco-justice course thread on extending justice vocabulary to the nonhuman realm. — connects to: Similarity-based recognition need not continue human rational supremacy — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice:…, 449; Nature’s kinship is affirmed in difference, not only by mirroring the self — Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 508; The same justice framework can bridge human and nonhuman realms — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice:…, 13 (+6 more)
• recurring: this claim recurs 2 times within its source

Broader Connections

• Recognition of nature via shared qualities need not claim equality #corroborates (0.90) — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice, 436
• Extending moral consideration to nature need not imply equality with humans #corroborates (0.85) — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice, 391