Learning to trust another is learning their interest in continuing interaction

Evidence

Finally, note that the simple learning account of figure 5.1 might seem superficially to be poorly fitted with the encapsulated-interest model of trust. To fit that model it must include the incentive effects of iterated interaction with the same person, as in the iterated oneway trust game or the mutual trust interaction of an iterated prisoner’s dilemma. If the account is to fit the encapsulated-interest model, then part of the learning that goes into revising one’s assessment of another’s trustworthiness is learning of the other’s interest in continuing the interaction. It is easy to misread the learning account as grounded in a purely dispositional view of trustworthiness, as discussed in chapter 2. If it is taken as an account of my assessing your capacity to judge your interests in cooperating with me, however, then it is fully consistent with the encapsulated-interest view. Hence with relevant simplifying assumptions the commonsense learning model fits with either the dispositional view of trustworthiness or the encapsulated-interest view of trust. The differences between the two are chiefly in the nature of the information another uses in updating his or her assessment of your trustworthiness or the way another reads your actions as grounded either in interests or in some moral or other disposition other than a concern to look after your interests. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 608

Categorization

• DEFINE: Clarifies the encapsulated-interest model by distinguishing what information the truster updates on vs. the dispositional view’s reading of moral character.
• XREF: Dovetails with the reading purpose: trust rests on observable constraints on opportunistic behavior, here specified as iterated incentives. — connects to: Maintaining social connection precedes exchanging accurate information in dialogue — Yves Citton, The Ecology of Attention, 254