Mafia electoral support is a directed investment in protective politicians, not generic partisanship.

Evidence

The only party we voted for was the Christian Democrats; this is because its representatives were those who had best protected the mafia… The rule was that a member could campaign only in favor of the Christian Democrats, while it was strictly forbidden to campaign or vote for the Communists and the Fascists. It was nonetheless permitted to vote for candidates of other political parties, but only on purely personal grounds—to return a personal favor—and in any event campaigning was forbidden. On one occasion the whole family backed a particular candidate… This was because the mafia was interested in placing certain men in specific positions. At other times votes were given to those candidates of the Christian Democratic party who, because of their power, could guarantee certain advantages. — Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Business of…, 478

Categorization

• XREF: The ‘placed in specific positions’ and ‘guarantee advantages’ language directly evidences Gambetta’s protection-market model, and the discipline of mandated single-party voting mirrors Schelling focal-point coordination enforced by the mafia as third party. — connects to: Lawyer-legislators acted as agents for organized interests, not mere occupational representatives. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 4119
• SEED: Vote-selling as an investment portfolio: mafiosi as disciplined electoral allocators who concentrate votes for maximum protective return — an angle on how organized crime mimics rational market behavior.