Large dispersed interests fail to organize due to free riding

Evidence

A major challenge to majoritarian pluralist theories, however, is posed by Mancur Olson’s argument that collective action by large, dispersed sets of individuals with individually small but collectively large interests tends to be prevented by the “free rider” problem. Barring special circumstances (selective incentives, byproducts, coercion), individuals who would benefit from collective action may have no incentive to personally form or join an organized group. If everyone thinks this way and lets George do it, the job is not likely to get done. This reasoning suggests that Truman’s “potential groups” may in fact be unlikely to form, even if millions of peoples’ interests are neglected or harmed by government. Aware of the collective action problem, officials may feel free to ignore much of the population and act against the interests of the average citizen. — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics, 34

Categorization

• XREF: The free-rider/collective-action problem directly supports the operationalization angle the reader seeks: the mechanism by which low-income majorities end up unrepresented at the policy level, distinct from any rhetoric about who is ‘climbing’. — connects to: Large collectivities cannot be trusted because free riding overrides shared interests; Civic engagement vulnerable to free riding declines fastest — Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone The Collapse and Revival…, 128; High stakes and good intentions do not overcome commons coordination failures (+4 more)

Broader Connections

• Large collectivities cannot be trusted because free riding overrides shared interests #corroborates (0.95)
• Intergroup cooperation unravels because free-riding and competition outcompete collective benefit. #corroborates (0.90)
• Large anonymous groups cannot sustain collective action without some enforcing mechanism #expands (0.88) — Norenzayan, Ara, Big gods - how religion transformed…, 412
• Network-based markets suffer free-riding when outsiders exploit customs without bearing membership costs. #exemplifies (0.85) — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 208
• Civic engagement vulnerable to free riding declines fastest #exemplifies (0.80) — Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone The Collapse and Revival…, 128
• High stakes and good intentions do not overcome commons coordination failures #corroborates (0.80)
• Cooperative civic activities decline faster than individual ones #exemplifies (0.78) — Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone The Collapse and Revival…, 127