High stakes and good intentions do not overcome commons coordination failures

Evidence

A first reaction to an analysis of this sort might be to discount the causal potency of these psychological processes. Given the enormous stakes involved, one might presume that groups and agencies composed of intelligent, dedicated individuals who would confront and creatively resolve whatever problems of cooperation and coordination were necessary to get their work done. There were, after all, compelling incentives for getting it all right: nothing less than the security of the homeland was at stake. Unfortunately, neither the extensive commons dilemma research literature nor the long history of examples that motivated it inspires much optimism in this regard. The tragedy of the commons, after all, is a parable about how difficult it is to slow the march of folly even when all of the participants involved are fully cognizant of just where the march is leading them. — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 2002 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Rational collectivities form through imperfect local commitment, not achieved perfection. — Mark Fisher (edited by Darren Ambrose), K-Punk: The Collected and Unpublished…, 2369; Well-intentioned ecological interventions can backfire through unforeseen food chains. — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 73; Transboundary environmental problems defeat decentralized local control — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 187 (+7 more)

Broader Connections

• High stakes and shared awareness do not prevent commons-style collective failures. #corroborates (0.95) — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 2002