Kruks argues Beauvoir rejected Sartre’s absolute freedom as early as 1940.

Evidence

Kruks claims that “already in 1940 Beauvoir had insisted against Sartre that ‘not every situation is equal’ from the point of view of freedom.” Kruks attributes to Sartre an absolute view of freedom and argues, “since situations are each uniquely brought into being by an individual free project … we [cannot] judge one situation to be more free than another.” Aft er all, “‘the slave in chains is as free as his master.’” So understood, Sartrean freedom does not come in degrees. … Hence, Sartre’s view of absolute freedom cannot be taken seriously. In contrast, as early as 1940, Beauvoir recognized the insuffi ciency of absolute individual freedom and therefore replaced it (or began to replace it) with a notion of interdependent freedom that more clearly illuminates the eff ects of social conditioning and oppression. — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 167

Categorization

  • DEFINE: Fixates the concept of Sartrean ‘absolute freedom’ — freedom that comes in no degrees, where a slave is as free as a master — crucial for following the authorship debate.
  • XREF: connects to: Sartre had already rejected absolute freedom before Beauvoir wrote Pyrrhus and Cinéas — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 175; Beauvoir’s two freedom claims target Sartre and 1940s misreaders separately — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 633; Beauvoir diverges from Sartre by excusing the oppressed from willing freedom — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 650 (+1 more)

Broader Connections