Sartre had already rejected absolute freedom before Beauvoir wrote Pyrrhus and Cinéas

Evidence

If what Kruks means by impossible freedom is absolute freedom, Sartre had already rejected this view. Once more, it is not at all clear that Pyrrhus and Cinéas shows any such thing. — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 175

Categorization

• XREF: Reverses the common scholarly trope that Beauvoir pushed Sartre to acknowledge limiting situations of oppression beyond Being and Nothingness. Relevant to the Kruks reading this chapter is contesting. — connects to: Sartre ultimately abandoned his early doctrine of absolute freedom — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 173; Beauvoir’s situated account of freedom moved Sartre beyond his earlier absolutism — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 46; Kruks argues Beauvoir rejected Sartre’s absolute freedom as early as 1940. — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 167

Broader Connections

• Beauvoir’s situated account of freedom moved Sartre beyond his earlier absolutism #complicates (0.85) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 46
• Kruks argues Beauvoir rejected Sartre’s absolute freedom as early as 1940. #contradicts (0.80) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 167