Beauvoir diverges from Sartre by excusing the oppressed from willing freedom

Evidence

In Th e Ethics of Ambiguity and Th e Second Sex, as well as in her journal, America Day by Day, Beauvoir suggests that severe oppression can render it impossible for an individual to will her freedom, that is, to choose to exercise self-consciously the ontological freedom she already possesses. In cases where one is repeatedly forced into subservience to another person, she implies, an individual may lack the existential resources necessary to assert her freedom positively and effi caciously as a person who exists for-herself and not just forthe-other. … Whereas Sartre would be forced to characterize this individual as being in bad faith for failing to recognize that she nonetheless possesses the ontological freedom that all for-itselves do, in fact, possess, Beauvoir suggests that the experience of severe oppression can render one incapable of attaining consciousness of one’s freedom and that one therefore cannot be blamed for failing to will one’s freedom from the limits imposed on one by the Other or by one’s situation. In such circumstances, she argues, it becomes the responsibility, not of the oppressed individual, but of other human beings to expand her horizons in emancipatory ways so that a new future becomes possible for her, even if at fi rst this appears only as a distant possibility. — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 650

Categorization

• XREF: Directly positions Beauvoir against Sartre’s bad-faith doctrine — central to the reader’s authorship/influence research. — connects to: Beauvoir’s bad faith is social and structural, unlike Sartre’s individual account. — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 72; Kruks argues Beauvoir rejected Sartre’s absolute freedom as early as 1940. — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 167; Beauvoir held that freedom remains irrepressible even under slavery and torture — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 175 (+5 more)
• DEFINE: Clarifies the Beauvoirian notion of ‘existential resources’ versus Sartrean ontological freedom.

Broader Connections

• Beauvoir holds Others as essential, challenging Sartre’s ontological individualism #qualifies (0.80) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 184