Extending moral consideration to nature need not imply equality with humans

Evidence

The standard criticism is that such a notion puts nature on an equal moral footing with humans. In reality, however, there is only very rarely an appearance of this language of equality. At most, the conception championed by Leopold, for example, asks for moral consideration of nonhuman nature; but such a consideration does not require a previous conclusion of equality. … We can make the claim for the moral consideration of nature as part of our extended community, and the inclusion of that nature in a theory of justice, without insisting that every part of nature has moral worth identical and equal to our own. — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice, 391

Categorization

• XREF: Lays groundwork for distinguishing distributive from recognition justice to nature — relevant to the reader’s three-part typology lens applied across Eco-Justice and Legal Systems. — connects to: Justice can attach to viable populations of species rather than to individuals — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice:…, 395; Anthropocentric homogenization denies individual beings’ integrity and moral standing — Rebecca A. Martusewicz, Jeff Edmundson, and John Lupinacci, EcoJustice Education: Toward Diverse,…, 595; Future-generation justice extends scope to humans but not to nature as a subject. — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice:…, 381 (+2 more)
• DEFINE: Clarifies what ‘extending the community of justice to nature’ actually does and does not claim.