Dehumanization works by disabling the empathetic self-sanctions that normally block mistreatment.

Evidence

Moral disengagement is the process through which we free ourselves from the negative consequences, primarily, but not exclusively, of a psychological nature (e.g., distress, shame, loss of reputation) that would likely follow should we acknowledge certain negative actions that we have committed (Bandura, 1999). Amid these strategies are euphemistic labeling (e.g., “collateral damage”), moral justification (“it is a battle against evil”), and dehumanization. The latter has received quite a lot of attention in psychological literature, and its function is well described by psychologist Albert Bandura. He argues that perceiving another person as human activates empathetic reactions that would make it difficult to mistreat him or her without risking personal distress, but that once the other is dehumanized, such self-sanctions for mistreatment can be disengaged (Bandura, 1990). — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 2096

Categorization

• DEFINE: Functional definition of moral disengagement with its three core strategies, useful as anchoring definition for the whole chapter thread.
• XREF: Bandura’s self-sanction disengagement links to the reader’s prior Allport reassessment on cognitive mechanics of prejudice.
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 2096