Institutions across cultures evolved mainly to publicize who violated communal norms.

Evidence

However, our core contention that institutions sometimes arise to make reputation mechanisms more effective by communicating information seems almost beyond dispute. The Mishipora, described in the Hebrew Talmud, according to which those who failed to keep promises were punished by being publicly denounced; the use of the “hue and cry” to identify cheaters in medieval England; the famed “Scarlet Letter,” described in Hawthorne’s famous story; and the public stocks and pillories of 17th century New England, which were sometimes used to punish errant local merchants, are all examples of institutions and practices in which a principal aim is to convey information to the community about who has violated its norms. — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 166

Categorization

• XREF: The Scarlet Letter repurposed for economic enforcement is a striking juxtaposition with its usual moral/religious reading — nods toward the Foucauldian view of public punishment as information display. — connects to: Institutions substitute for trust by securing trustworthiness coercively.; Social order can emerge from distrust rather than trust. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 784; Harsh antisocial punishment is culturally correlated with weak civic norms. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 194
• SHARE: The Mishipora Talmudic denunciation practice and the 17th-century New England stocks punishing merchants are exactly the kind of detail a friend studying reputation economics would want.

Broader Connections

• Institutions substitute for trust by securing trustworthiness coercively. #corroborates (0.85)
• Social order can emerge from distrust rather than trust. #corroborates (0.82) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 784