Income inequality reflects relative bargaining power between actor groups, not markets

Evidence

We conceive of income inequality as a result of social relations between sets of actors, in which interaction and its resulting institutions generate greater advantages for some actors than for others ưTilly 1998, 2000ƞ. Income distributions, whether between capital and labor or among workers in various structural positions, reflect the relative bargaining and claimsmaking power of actors in a given organizational and environmental context ưTomaskovic-Devey et al. 2009; Avent-Holt and Tomaskovic-Devey 2010ƞ. This power can be based on control of capital or positions, market demand for goods or skills, or simply the persuasiveness of actors in a specific institutional and cultural context. From this perspective, deunionization and globalization both reduced the claims-making power of labor, particularly blue collar workers. We suspect that the financialization of nonfinance firms also restructured the social relations between owners and workers, elite and general workers, and employees in general, thus reshaping the relative power of actors along these divides. — Ken-Hou Lin & Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, Financialization and U.S. Income…, 36

Categorization

  • XREF: The relational/claims-making power framing echoes Acemoglu & Robinson-style institutional political economy and the bargaining-power literature the reader already holds. — connects to: Income distributions reflect actors’ relative bargaining and claimsmaking power.; Unionization decreases income inequality by disciplining employer power — Nikole Hannah-Jones et al., The 1619 Project: A New American Origin…, 583; Ideological hegemony operates when subordinates internalize the dominant group’s justifications of inequality (+6 more)

Broader Connections