Humans hold systematic moral intuitions about proportionate sharing, helping, and punishment.

Evidence

Humans don’t just cooperate. They cooperate in a great variety of quite specific ways and have strong views in each case on how it should be done (with substantial cultural variations). In collective actions aimed at a common goal, there is a right way to share the benefits: Those who have contributed more should receive more. When helping others, there is a right amount to give. One may have the duty to give a few coins to beggars in the street, but one does not owe them half of one’s wealth, however helpful it would be to them. When people deserve to be punished, there is a right amount of punishment. Most people in societies with a modern penal system would agree that a year in jail is too much for the theft of an apple and not enough for a murder. People have strong intuitions regarding the right way to share the benefits of activity, the right way to help the needy, and the right way to punish the guilty. Do these intuitions, notwithstanding their individual and cultural variability, have a common logic, and, if so, to what extent is this logic rooted in evolved dispositions? — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 6

Categorization

  • DEFINE: Sets up the core question of whether moral intuitions share an evolved common logic.
  • DEEPTHINKING: Frames the entire inquiry: the puzzle of proportionate moral intuitions across cultural variation, and their possible evolutionary roots.
  • XREF: connects to: Morality evolved as a propensity for fair cost-benefit sharing among cooperators. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 266; Human morality is contingent rather than invariant across circumstances. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 390; Group size determines the moral duty each person owes to another in need. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 102 (+5 more)

Broader Connections