Hegelian time is being that is not and not-being that is

Evidence

‘Time’, Hegel states in this paragraph, is ‘the being which, in being, is not and in not-being, is’. A dialectical understanding of this phrase brings out its necessary ‘double meaning’. Normally, it can be understood in the first and primary way: time is and is not to the degree that its moments cancel each other out; the present is a ‘now’ which exists, but as it is something which passes, it will soon, almost immediately in fact, exist no longer; this is the present as an instant hanging between two non-existents, the past and the future. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 253

Categorization

• DEFINE: Unpacks Hegel’s Encyclopedia paragraph 258 definition of time as the dialectical unity of being and non-being.
• XREF: The dialectical account of time recapitulates the same self-negating structure Malabou maps onto plasticity and anticipates her neurological work on time and trauma. — connects to: Hegel holds pure being and pure nothingness to be the same; Hegel’s time concept fuses Aristotle’s now-analysis with Kant’s pure form of sensibility — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 255; Hegelian time is dialectically differentiated and never fixed by its moments — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 249 (+8 more)

Broader Connections

• Hegelian time is dialectically differentiated and never fixed by its moments #expands (0.95) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 249
• Neither ancient nor modern notions of time adequately capture time’s twofold negation #corroborates (0.90) — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 118
• Time is not the container of becoming but is itself the becoming #exemplifies (0.88) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 257
• Hegelian predication expresses mutual implication rather than attachment of one thing to another #expands (0.85) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 1171