Hegelian time is dialectically differentiated and never fixed by its moments
Evidence
The deployment of the Hegelian conception of time is not fixed by reference to the places and the times – to the ‘moments’ – of its treatment within the System. Time is a dialectically differentiated instance; its being divided into definite moments determines it only for a moment. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 249
Categorization
- XREF: Connects to the book’s central thesis that plasticity operates on temporality itself, not just on concepts. — connects to: Temporalized totality is never achieved but flees from itself.; Hegelian time is being that is not and not-being that is — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 253; Hegel’s System is immanently temporalized through its own double perspective — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 272 (+5 more)
- recurring: this claim recurs 2 times within its source
Broader Connections
- Hegel’s temporal movement spans both logical structure and historical unfolding
#expands(0.85) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 278 - Hegel’s System is immanently temporalized through its own double perspective
#corroborates(0.82) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 272 - Hegel’s Man-God-Philosopher triad are temporal perspectives, not fixed substances
#exemplifies(0.78) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 287 - Neither ancient nor modern notions of time adequately capture time’s twofold negation
#corroborates(0.75) — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 118