Hegelian predication expresses mutual implication rather than attachment of one thing to another

Evidence

For example: ‘the statue is made of bronze’. It is easy to see that bronze is no more being added or attached to the statue than the statue is being added to the bronze. Rather, the statue is defined on the basis of its bronze just as the bronze takes on a particular form in the statue. The two aspects mutually imply one another; they are essential to each other, they mutually impose themselves on each other (s’imposent … l’un à l’autre), and are not superimposed. They are a matter for sublation (relève), where ‘relever’ in French does not just mean ‘to be the concern of’, or ‘be under the jurisdiction of’, but also ‘to rise’, ’ to bring out the true relief’. Consequently, every proposition can be understood as a sublation in this sense, for within it appears the overhanging relief (surplomb) that completes it. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 1171

Categorization

• DEFINE: Clarifies ‘relever’ as multi-layered French term — to concern, to rise, to bring out relief — which grounds the concept of sublation in a single polysemous word.
• XREF: The bronze/statue example parallels the form-matter dialectic the reader’s brain-work on plasticity will need — matter and form mutually constituting each other rather than passive substrate. — connects to: Hegelian time is being that is not and not-being that is — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 253; For Hegel spirit is not merely self-contained thought but essentially self-revelation and objectivity — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 815; Content’s determinateness is self-given, not externally attached, in Hegel (+6 more)

Broader Connections

• Hegel’s reason is both a priori and a posteriori in absolute unity #expands (0.85)
• Reading Hegel requires a beginning that both foresees and does not foresee what follows #expands (0.75) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 1240