Hegel rejects Catholic real presence because its permanence resists the vulgar concept of time

Evidence

‘Time’, Hegel states in this paragraph, is ‘the being which, in being, is not and in not-being, is’. A dialectical understanding of this phrase brings out its necessary ‘double meaning’. Normally, it can be understood in the first and primary way: time is and is not to the degree that its moments cancel each other out; the present is a ‘now’ which exists, but as it is something which passes, it will soon, almost immediately in fact, exist no longer; this is the present as an instant hanging between two non-existents, the past and the future. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 253 (#expands, via linked claim)

The deployment of the Hegelian conception of time is not fixed by reference to the places and the times – to the ‘moments’ – of its treatment within the System. Time is a dialectically differentiated instance; its being divided into definite moments determines it only for a moment. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 249 (#expands, via linked claim)

Isn’t the plasticity of the Hegelian concept of time itself the source of a clandestine resistance, ready and waiting to respond to the accusation of vulgarity which Heidegger raised against that same concept? I have attempted to show that this temporalizing plasticity protects the Hegelian analysis of temporality from being instantly slotted into the cosmological framework of ‘levelled-down time’, the frame which a ‘paraphrase’ of Aristotle would have allowed Hegel to adopt without even putting it into question. On this account I decided to take as my starting point for this study not Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature, but the Philosophy of Spirit. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 1272 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim
• XREF: connects to: Hegelian time is being that is not and not-being that is — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 253; Hegel’s temporalizing plasticity resists Heidegger’s charge of vulgar time — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 1272; Hegelian time is dialectically differentiated and never fixed by its moments — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 249 (+2 more)

Broader Connections

• Hegelian time is being that is not and not-being that is #expands (0.85) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 253
• Hegelian time is dialectically differentiated and never fixed by its moments #expands (0.82) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 249
• Hegel’s temporalizing plasticity resists Heidegger’s charge of vulgar time #corroborates (0.80) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 1272