Hegel’s time concept fuses Aristotle’s now-analysis with Kant’s pure form of sensibility

Evidence

Here time is simultaneously presented both according to its classical Greek, or more precisely, Aristotelian determination and according to its modern, that is to say, Kantian determination. If the analysis of the now, the definition of time as ‘a being which, in being, is not’, is effectively borrowed from Physics IV, the definition of time as ‘the pure form of sensibility’ (Hegel writes in fact: ‘Time, like space, is a pure form of sense or intuition; it is the non-sensuous sensuous (das unsinnliche Sinnliche)’) obviously comes from the Critique of Pure Reason. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 255

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to Malabou’s larger project of showing Hegel synthesizing prior philosophical determinations — parallels a reader’s Kant/Aristotle background. — connects to: Hegelian time is being that is not and not-being that is — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 253; Descartes and Kant both assigned temporal unity to an extra-temporal being — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 465; Hegel’s dialectic aimed to repair Kant’s split between mind and world. (+1 more)

Broader Connections

• Hegelian time is being that is not and not-being that is #expands (0.85) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 253
• Hegel’s dialectic aimed to repair Kant’s split between mind and world. #expands (0.75)
• Descartes and Kant both assigned temporal unity to an extra-temporal being #qualifies (0.70) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 465