Hayek’s epistemology drew on the same tacit-embodied model as Polanyi’s science

Evidence

There is an important conceptual distinction to be made here, brought to my attention by John O’Neill. Hayek himself almost never treated knowledge as a “thing,” but instead rather as tacit, local, and embodied—rather similar to the way in which Michael Polanyi described science. — Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin, 2162

Categorization

• XREF: Michael Polanyi’s concept of tacit knowledge — a parallel tradition to Hayek, useful for the reader’s intellectual-network mapping. — connects to: Hayek’s market argument rests on an epistemology of dispersed tacit knowledge — Dieter Plehwe, Quinn Slobodian & Philip Mirowski (eds.), Nine Lives of Neoliberalism, 72; Hayek argued contextual individual knowledge cannot be statistically aggregated — Jessica Whyte, The Morals of the Market: Human Rights…, 211; Neoliberals recast Hayek’s tacit knowledge into a commodified thing for scientific resonance — Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making…, 2162 (+1 more)