Early neoliberalism built its social theory on a market-modeled epistemology of dispersed tacit knowledge

Evidence

Despite their irreconcilable political differences, Polanyi and Bernal envisaged in remarkably similar ways the operation of social norms within the scientific community and the paucity of a history of science told as the progressive evolution of intangible ideas. Each argued in their own way “for a social turn in studying the history and philosophy of science.” As a result, the project of recoding liberalism incorporated the growing externalist account of science that sought to reground its history within the social and economic determinants of scientific research and knowledge. Neoliberal philosophers of science largely agreed with the necessity of conceptualizing knowledge and science within their institutional conditions and not as a disembodied process, yet proposed an alternative model for the workings of science which drew its inspiration from economic liberalism: the Republic of Science. In this model, the metaphor of the market played out as the epistemological engine of a largely dispersed and tacit knowledge between individuals, be they scientists, producers, lawyers, or road-users. The rule of law, market regulations, and scientific conventions were conceived as so many analogical methods of social coordination to achieve a liberal social order, as they ensured a variety of ends with minimum direct control. Peculiar to neoliberalism therefore is the strong epistemological bent of its social theory, one where freedom is recoded as instrumental to the activity of separate independent orders working according to analogous principles. — Dieter Plehwe, Quinn Slobodian & Philip Mirowski (eds.), Nine Lives of Neoliberalism, 82

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to Hayek’s ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society’ and Michael Polanyi’s Republic of Science essay, and to Friedrich/Lippmann colloquium material elsewhere in this book about the shared epistemological frame of early neoliberal thinkers. — connects to: Neoliberal anti-planning arguments rest on the dispersal and tacit character of social knowledge. — Dieter Plehwe, Quinn Slobodian & Philip Mirowski (eds.), Nine Lives of Neoliberalism, 71; Neoliberalism’s knowledge limits are anti-positivist and extend beyond economics — Dieter Plehwe, Quinn Slobodian & Philip Mirowski (eds.), Nine Lives of Neoliberalism, 74; Neoliberalism reframed politics as an epistemological question of what can be known — Dieter Plehwe, Quinn Slobodian & Philip Mirowski (eds.), Nine Lives of Neoliberalism, 54 (+3 more)
• DEFINE: The ‘Republic of Science’ model and its epistemic framing of markets is carefully defined here — key for distinguishing this school from later Chicago-school variants.

Broader Connections

• Hayek’s market argument rests on an epistemology of dispersed tacit knowledge #exemplifies (0.92) — Dieter Plehwe, Quinn Slobodian & Philip Mirowski (eds.), Nine Lives of Neoliberalism, 72
• Neoliberalism reframed politics as an epistemological question of what can be known #expands (0.90) — Dieter Plehwe, Quinn Slobodian & Philip Mirowski (eds.), Nine Lives of Neoliberalism, 54
• Neoliberalism’s social theory is fundamentally epistemological, recoding freedom as instrumental to independent orders #expands (0.88)
• Neoliberalism’s scientific framing made knowledge and truth political questions #expands (0.85) — Dieter Plehwe, Quinn Slobodian & Philip Mirowski (eds.), Nine Lives of Neoliberalism, 54