Algerian integration was only ever workable before 1958

Evidence

In Algeria he had the pieds noirs at least temporarily under control. But as far as peace was concerned only disappointment could be recorded. His first attempt to obtain a cease-fire had been rejected with a crushing snub by the F.L.N. and the November elections had not led to the emergence of any tangible “third force” of interlocuteurs valables. Thus everything was at an impasse, and would remain so for the best part of the ensuing year. And, as well as that initial momentum, he had lost time that was irretrievable. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 957 (#qualifies, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Demographic arithmetic made Algerian integration untenable for France by 1958; Algeria’s independence had become irreversible by 1959; De Gaulle’s political successes could not translate into any Algerian peace progress — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 957 (+1 more)

Related

• Integration was feasible in 1936 but a delusion by 1958 (similarity 0.91)
• De Gaulle’s political successes could not translate into any Algerian peace progress (similarity 0.89)
• Demographic arithmetic made Algerian integration untenable for France by 1958 (similarity 0.89)
• Algeria’s independence had become irreversible by 1959 (similarity 0.88)
• Algerian integration would numerically swamp metropolitan France politically. (similarity 0.85)
• Pieds noirs read integration as a path to numerical submergence of Muslims (similarity 0.83)
• Both Muslims and pieds noirs read integration through self-serving demographic math. (similarity 0.83)
• Franco-Algerian coexistence was destroyed by accumulated missed chances (similarity 0.83)
• Integration would have demographically swamped metropolitan France (similarity 0.83)
• De Gaulle presented secession as one of Algeria’s three possible futures. (similarity 0.83)
• France could not contemplate Algerian withdrawal because Algeria was legally part of France (similarity 0.82)
• De Gaulle’s slow pace in 1958 squandered momentum to the FLN (similarity 0.82)
• Granting Tunisian and Moroccan independence without Algeria was a strategic error. (similarity 0.82)
• The Battle of Algiers marked the end of any possibility of negotiated settlement (similarity 0.81)
• Interdependence forced reconciliation between France and Algeria despite violence. (similarity 0.81)

Broader Connections

• Algeria’s independence had become irreversible by 1959 #corroborates (0.70)
• Integration was feasible in 1936 but a delusion by 1958 #corroborates (0.60)
• De Gaulle’s political successes could not translate into any Algerian peace progress #qualifies (0.40) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 957