Germany reframed Europe’s banking crisis as a state spending problem to justify cuts

Evidence

Once the immediate liquidity crunch of 2008 seemed to have passed, the crisis diagnosis preferred by Europe’s dominant power was that the continent’s problem was a crisis of state spending. The correct policy was therefore to cut the budgets of these profligate periphery states. — Mark Blyth, Austerity, 151

Categorization

• XREF: This is the core causal move of the whole austerity intellectual history—the diagnosis shapes the cure—connecting back to how the 1919 and 1920s episodes framed deficits as crises. — connects to: German officials misdiagnosed 2008 as an Anglo-Saxon laissez-faire banking crisis — Mark Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous…, 151; German anti-stimulus stance stems from a belief that government policy failures cause crises — Mark Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous…, 166; Neoliberalism’s crisis strategy redirected blame from banks onto state debt — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 475 (+2 more)

Broader Connections

• Neoliberalism’s crisis strategy redirected blame from banks onto state debt #corroborates (0.88) — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 475
• German anti-stimulus stance stems from a belief that government policy failures cause crises #expands (0.82) — Mark Blyth, Austerity, 166
• The European debt crisis resulted from banking losses, not sovereign overspending #corroborates (0.80) — Mark Blyth, Austerity, 40
• European fiscal crises were consequences of private banking crises, not their cause #corroborates (0.78) — Mark Blyth, Austerity, 205