German officials misdiagnosed 2008 as an Anglo-Saxon laissez-faire banking crisis

Evidence

In late 2008, it seemed that European banks had escaped the worst of the crisis. Apart from a few German banks and a Belgian bank here or there that got in over its head, what Europe had, said German politicians in particular, was a “crisis of Anglo-Saxon banking.” As German finance minister Peer Steinbrück put it, the real cause of the financial crisis was “the irresponsible overemphasis on the ‘laissez-faire’ principle, namely giving market forces the most possible freedom from state regulation, in the Anglo-American financial system.” The European banking model, in contrast, was said to be much sounder because of its conservative practices, so there was no need for Europe to throw money at the problem as the United States and the United Kingdom had done. — Mark Blyth, Austerity, 151

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the ideological blame-shifting mechanism that Blyth argues drove austerity—the ‘crisis of state spending’ diagnosis—and to the narrative of Anglo-American culpability elsewhere in the book. — connects to: Germany reframed Europe’s banking crisis as a state spending problem to justify cuts — Mark Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous…, 151; German neoliberal thought persistently shaped German economic policy through 2008 and beyond — Dieter Plehwe, Quinn Slobodian & Philip Mirowski (eds.), Nine Lives of Neoliberalism, 611

Broader Connections

• Germany reframed Europe’s banking crisis as a state spending problem to justify cuts #expands (0.75) — Mark Blyth, Austerity, 151
• German neoliberal thought persistently shaped German economic policy through 2008 and beyond #complicates (0.72) — Dieter Plehwe, Quinn Slobodian & Philip Mirowski (eds.), Nine Lives of Neoliberalism, 611