German anti-stimulus stance stems from a belief that government policy failures cause crises
Evidence
German policy makers and voters believe the story. The policy lesson learned by the most powerful (and solvent) European state was that policy failures by governments, not financial markets, make crises. Consequently, the policy “success” of 2008—the return of the master and his stimulus measures—was seen by the Germans and their allies at the ECB as a policy disaster waiting to happen whose consequences would only become all too apparent in future inflation. Present debt increases were just the canary in the coalmine. Given this, the Germans were not about to sign on to any more stimulus efforts, regardless of pressure from the United States. — Mark Blyth, Austerity, 166
Categorization
- XREF: Connects directly to the intellectual-history thread of where austerity’s policy consensus came from, complementing the Mattei precursor reading on how crisis narratives shape policy response. — connects to: Germany reframed Europe’s banking crisis as a state spending problem to justify cuts — Mark Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous…, 151; The crisis-as-government-fault narrative was engineered to justify austerity — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 950; The crisis narrative blaming government interference absorbed leftwing grievances to defend market orthodoxy — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 496 (+3 more)
Broader Connections
- The crisis-as-government-fault narrative was engineered to justify austerity
#expands(0.85) — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 950 - The crisis narrative blaming government interference absorbed leftwing grievances to defend market orthodoxy
#expands(0.82) — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 496 - Treating economic shocks as blameworthy endogenous outcomes justifies removing policy tools from elected officials
#expands(0.78) — Mark Blyth, Austerity, 253 - Austrian economics interprets corporate cash hoarding in recessions as rational fear of state expropriation
#contradicts(0.72) — Mark Blyth, Austerity, 395