Genuine historical thinking holds truths as period-bound without collapsing into relativism.

Evidence

To think of a philosophical affirmation as true in a particular historical period (that is, as the necessary and inseparable expression of a particular historical action, of a particular praxis) but as superseded and rendered “vain” in a succeeding period, without however falling into scepticism and moral and ideological relativism, in other words to see philosophy as historicity, is quite an arduous and difficult mental operation. — Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 1552

Categorization

• DEFINE: Core Gramscian definition of historicity — a truth valid for its praxis-context yet superseded, without scepticism. This is the anti-relativist dialectical stance that recurs across critical theory.
• XREF: Connects to the earlier Hall notes on conjunctural knowledge and theory as non-relativist yet historically situated; likewise to the Frankfurt School critique of positivism as naive metaphysics. — connects to: Philosophical truths are historically conditioned yet avoid relativism.; Common sense has a content and a history despite feeling natural and timeless.; Philosophical truths are valid only as expressions of a specific historical praxis

Broader Connections

• Philosophical truths are historically conditioned yet avoid relativism. #corroborates (1.00)
• Common sense has a content and a history despite feeling natural and timeless. #exemplifies (0.78)
• Philosophical truths are valid only as expressions of a specific historical praxis #qualifies (0.75)