Genocidal scapegoating requires widespread life crises that frustrate multiple basic needs, not mundane frustrations.

Evidence

Staub’s (1989) refinement of the frustration–aggression perspective suggests one answer to Allport’s first criticism that (contrary to frustration– aggression theory) frustration does not always turn into aggression against scapegoats. Staub theorized that genocides and mass killings require widespread, extremely ā€œdifficult life conditionsā€ (due to social, political, and/or economic upheavals) that frustrate a host of basic needs, for physical wellbeing, safety, a sense of belonging, selfand group esteem, and hope for the future. Mundane frustrations are insufficient to spawn scapegoating movements, which gain adherents by promising to fulfill the heightened needs of a mass of people (e.g., safety and prosperity will be achieved by attacking the ā€œenemyā€). — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 1575 (#expands, via linked claim)

The model begins with (A) widespread, shared frustrations, the kind of group-level events that Staub (1989) and Tajfel (1981) viewed as a prerequisite for scapegoating. These difficult life conditions (B) frustrate basic needs and arouse shared anxieties (Staub, 1989) that (C) lead to a collective search for explanations and solutions (Tajfel, 1981). — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 1591 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: Instigators rise by offering hope in crises that relies on scapegoating. — Leonard S. Newman and Ralph Erber (eds.), Understanding Genocide: The Social…, 1704; Difficult times heighten basic needs that scapegoat movements exploit; Shared frustrations from difficult life conditions precede collective scapegoating. — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Years…, 1591 (+10 more)

Broader Connections