Generalized trust is not necessary for social order

Evidence

The claim by many scholars that generalized trust is necessary for social order is surely wrong on one count and undemonstrated and perhaps beyond demonstration on another. First, it is merely widespread, not generalized, trust that even might be necessary. Second, although there might be a causal arrow from social order to trusting, and as well a causal arrow from trusting to enhanced social order, it may be beyond demonstration whether there is any necessary link. Furthermore, both for initiation of social order and for mere maintenance of social order, widespread trust seems not to be necessary, as is suggested by quite diverse cases, such as Fredrik Barth’s accounts of the Omani and Swat Pathan social orders (discussed in chapter 4), social orders (including Nazi-ruled Czechoslovakia) that have been maintained nearly by pure force, and the transitions from endemic distrust to social order in Eastern Europe from 1989 forward. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 806

Categorization

• XREF: Directly relevant to the reader’s integration task: the claim that social order can be maintained by pure force (Nazi Czechoslovakia) and Hobbesian mechanisms echoes the blindness novel’s collapse into predation — where no trust mechanism survives and order depends on force. — connects to: Micro-foundational safety does not guarantee systemic safety — Mark Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous…, 131; Widespread mutual trust alone makes large-scale non-domination freedom possible — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 1300
• QUESTION: Worth chasing: what does Saramago’s blindness epidemic show about whether force alone can sustain order, versus Hardin’s claim here that force can?