Escalating polarization in 1960 crushed centrist moderates in France’s Algerian debate

Evidence

But in November 1954 the unyielding gospel of l’Algérie, c’est la France very much represented French political opinion of almost all hues; on the other hand, Mendès-France also had reasons of internal politics for making quite such bellicose noises. The fate of his reforming government was at stake. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 317 (#qualifies, via linked claim)

When the Blum-Viollette Bill collapsed, however, an impossible predicament confronted the liberals: on the one hand, they saw themselves looked on as renegades by Messali and the Ulema; on the other, they were rejected by the French. It was a bitter personal disillusion for Abbas, who, from this moment, began to move away from the ideal of assimilation towards some form of autonomy for Algeria. Thus, at least ideologically, he and his supporters were brought a long step closer to the “revolutionaries” — a progression, tragic for France, that was to be repeated each time “moderate” Algerian nationalists found their overtures repulsed by the government of France, or by the pied noir lobbies. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 115 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: The 1960 Algerian debate polarized France between two manifestos.; Celebrity intellectuals openly incited desertion from the Algerian war and shifted French politics; France’s rejection of moderate Algerian reformers radicalized them into revolutionaries — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 115 (+7 more)

Broader Connections