Drones are morally justified by preventing one’s own casualties

Evidence

His thesis is based on what he calls the ā€œprinciple of unnecessary risk,ā€ according to which it is ā€œwrong to command someone to take on unnecessary potentially lethal risk.ā€ His reasoning runs as follows: ā€œI argue that we have a duty to protect an agent engaged in a justified act from harm to the greatest extent possible, so long as that protection does not interfere with the agent’s ability to act justly. UAVs afford precisely such protection. Therefore, we are obligated to employ UAV weapon systems if it can be shown that their use does not significantly reduce a warfighter’s operational capacity.ā€ — Grégoire Chamayou, A Theory of the Drone, 455 (#responds-to, via linked claim)

According to this view of military morality, to kill while exposing one’s own life is bad; to take lives without ever endangering one’s own is good. That first principle of drone necroethics is, paradoxically, vitalist. And it is in accordance with this logic that the drone can be said to be a ā€œhumanitarianā€ weapon: the humanitarian imperative is to save lives. And the drone does indeed save our lives. It is therefore a humanitarian technology. QED. — Grégoire Chamayou, A Theory of the Drone, 453 (#contradicts, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: Jus in bello norms applied to drones convert combat ethics into necroethics; Kamikaze and drone embody opposing economic and ethical regimes; Drone morality inverts ethics to make unendangered killing good — Grégoire Chamayou, A Theory of the Drone, 453 (+18 more)

Broader Connections