Zero-risk warfare implies radical inequality in the value of lives

Evidence

According to this view of military morality, to kill while exposing one’s own life is bad; to take lives without ever endangering one’s own is good. That first principle of drone necroethics is, paradoxically, vitalist. And it is in accordance with this logic that the drone can be said to be a ā€œhumanitarianā€ weapon: the humanitarian imperative is to save lives. And the drone does indeed save our lives. It is therefore a humanitarian technology. QED. — Grégoire Chamayou, A Theory of the Drone, 453 (#expands, via linked claim)

Using new means, the drone procures for its operators an even greater sense of invulnerability. Today as yesterday, the radical imbalance in exposure to death leads to a redefinition of relations of hostility and of the very sense of what is called ā€œwaging war.ā€ Warfare, by distancing itself totally from the model of hand-to-hand combat, becomes something quite different, a ā€œstate of violenceā€ of a different kind. It degenerates into slaughter or hunting. One no longer fights the enemy; one eliminates him, as one shoots rabbits. — Grégoire Chamayou, A Theory of the Drone, 332 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: Accepted zero-risk killing would collapse just war theory; Claimed precision paradoxically expands global killing rather than limiting it; Remote killing free from retaliation creates a moral hazard problem (+6 more)

Broader Connections