Distribution alone is incomplete because recognition, participation, and capability gaps also cause injustice.

Evidence

Theorists have defined justice in numerous ways; in my eyes, the most interesting and relevant definitions have come when theorists pay attention to what movements that articulate justice as a goal have to say. Again, I am not claiming that distributive notions of justice are passé or irrelevant—simply that they are incomplete. Inequitable distribution, a lack of recognition, limited participation, and a critical lack of capabilities, at both the individual and group level, all work to produce injustice. — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice, 169

Categorization

• recurring: this claim recurs 2 times within its source
• XREF: connects to: Injustice is experienced simultaneously across distribution, recognition, participation, and functioning. — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice:…, 264; Justice requires addressing recognition and distribution as distinct yet linked injustices. — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice:…, 65; Assuming recognition within distributional theory fails empirically to address real injustice — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice:…, 90 (+5 more)

Broader Connections

• Justice comprises interlinked distribution, recognition, participation, and capability #corroborates (0.95) — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice, 53
• Justice theory extends beyond distribution to recognition, capability, and participation #corroborates (0.95) — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice, 33
• Justice requires participation parity alongside distribution and recognition. #corroborates (0.90) — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice, 66
• Justice requires addressing recognition and distribution as distinct yet linked injustices. #expands (0.85) — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice, 65
• Capability approaches locate injustice in limited capacities, not denied goods. #expands (0.82) — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice, 146
• Justice is trivalent because participation depends on both distribution and recognition #expands (0.80) — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice, 120
• Assuming recognition within distributional theory fails empirically to address real injustice #contradicts (0.78) — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice, 90