Assuming recognition within distributional theory fails empirically to address real injustice

Evidence

The claim made by distributional theorists that recognition is assumed offers no practical discussion of recognition, no link between a lack of recognition and existing distributional inequities, and no attention to the institutional structures and practices that mediate both recognition and distribution. Justice in theory may happen in isolation, neutrality, or behind a veil of ignorance, but that is simply not the case in practice. If the interest is about attaining justice, rather than attaining a sound theory of justice, recognition is central to the question and the resolution—and is not simply to be assumed. Again, the point here is that the assumptions of distributional justice simply do not stand in the empirical realm. — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice, 90

Categorization

• XREF: This is the analytic payoff passage connecting to my Eco-Justice / Legal Systems reading: the argument that ‘recognition assumed’ in distributional theory fails empirically maps onto how EJ litigation and noise regulation jurisdictions often assume community standing without procedural admissibility. — connects to: Maldistribution cannot be cured without prior social and structural recognition — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice:…, 89; Political theorists have reduced justice almost exclusively to distribution — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice:…, 54; Misdistribution stems from prior failures of social and cultural recognition. — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice:…, 61 (+1 more)
• DEEPTHINKING: The pragmatic-existence-over-theory distinction (‘attaining justice rather than attaining a sound theory of justice’) is a genuinely dense reframing, but it mostly extends the well-argued recognition point from ch. 11-18 — leaving it a solid analytic marker rather than top-5%.