Descriptions can become true because people act on them believing they are true

Evidence

For example, Palestinians fighting to regain land on the West Bank from Israel may be described either as “freedom fighters” or as “terrorists.” It is a fact that they are fighting, but what does the fighting mean? The facts alone cannot decide. And the very language we use—“freedom fighters/terrorists”—is part of the difficulty. Moreover, certain descriptions, even if they appear false to us, can be made “true” because people act on them believing that they are true, and so their actions have real consequences. Whether the Palestinians are terrorists or not, if we think they are, and act on that “knowledge,” they in effect become terrorists because we treat them as such. The language (discourse) has real effects in practice: the description becomes “true.” — Stuart Hall, Essential Essays, Volume 2, 577

Categorization

• XREF: The “terrorist/freedom fighter” construal mechanism is precisely the representational logic later Islamophobia readings apply to Muslim world figuration; also the performativity-of-description point echoes Butler. — connects to: Knowledge created from a position of strength produces the object it claims to describe; Costly public deeds signal genuine belief that words can fake; Readers simultaneously believe fiction and know it is fabricated — Janet Burroway; Elizabeth Stuckey-French; Ned Stuckey-French, Writing Fiction, Tenth Edition: A Guide…, 583 (+15 more)
• DEFINE: Illustrates how discourse has real material effects in practice.
• ADDENDUM: Parallels the ‘Complaints About Immodesty’ dynamic where contested moral description of the Other is itself a power struggle over who gets to define meaning.
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Stuart Hall, Essential Essays, Volume 2: Identity…, 577

Broader Connections

• Repeated negative representations lead audiences to accept them as truths #corroborates (0.92) — Chris Allen, Islamophobia, 498
• A claim’s falsity does not bar it from structuring thought #corroborates (0.85) — Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 179
• Each society has a regime of truth that determines what counts as true #expands (0.80)
• Acting-trust pressure can rearrange beliefs to justify exceptions #expands (0.80)
• The layered structure of belief makes totalitarian lies foolproof against exposure #expands (0.80)
• Positivist truths are linguistic illusions grown canonical through use #expands (0.78)
• Corrective realism accepts terms set in advance by stereotype-makers #expands (0.78) — Peter Morey, Islamophobia and the Novel, 162
• Costly public deeds signal genuine belief that words can fake #complicates (0.75)
• Subordinated regimes of truth sustain plausibility for oppressed subjects #expands (0.75)
• Readers simultaneously believe fiction and know it is fabricated #qualifies (0.72) — Janet Burroway; Elizabeth Stuckey-French; Ned Stuckey-French, Writing Fiction, Tenth Edition, 583