Costly public deeds signal genuine belief that words can fake

Evidence

This is one of the reasons why talk is not a substitute for moves. Moves can in some way alter the game, by incurring manifest costs, risks, or a reduced range of subsequent choice; they have an information content, or evidence content, of a different character from that of speech. Talk can be cheap when moves are not (except for the “talk” that takes the form of enforcible threats, promises, commitments, and so forth, and that is to be analyzed under the heading of moves rather than communication anyway). Mutual accommodation ultimately requires, if the outcome is to be efficient, that the division of gains be in accordance with “comparative advantage”; that is, the things a player concedes should be those that he wants less than the other player, relative to the things he trades for. Each needs, therefore, to communicate his value system with some truth, although each can also gain by deceiving. While one’s maneuvers are not unambiguous in their revelation of one’s value systems and may even be deliberately deceptive, they nevertheless have an evidential quality that mere speech has not. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 282 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Costly displays distinguish sincere believers from fakers; A non-costly action can still credibly signal sincere belief.; Moves carry evidential weight that cheap talk cannot convey — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 282 (+2 more)

Related

• A non-costly action can still credibly signal sincere belief. (similarity 0.84)
• Moves carry evidential weight that cheap talk cannot convey (similarity 0.82)

Broader Connections

• Costly displays distinguish sincere believers from fakers #corroborates (0.95)
• A non-costly action can still credibly signal sincere belief. #contradicts (0.90)
• Moves carry evidential weight that cheap talk cannot convey #corroborates (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 282